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that the law is a natural growth of human society and changes to
answer the varying conditions and tempers of the culture that
sustains it,17
lawyers and law students who read Professor Richardson's book may
expect to find their minds quickened to the realization that the lawmedicine relationship is more than a courtroom experience. It is
becoming an experience of societal import-of life itself.
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.*

MORALITY AND TiM LAW. By Samuel Enoch Stumpf.t Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. Pp. 247. $5.00.
This is a disappointing book. Its main theme is that although
law and morality are not identical, they are nonetheless so interconnected that the law cannot be considered in isolation from
morality. The author examines the relationship between law and
morality in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in the
Soviet concept of law, in the positivist theory of law, and in international law. He discusses Hobbes' notion of natural law and condudes with some general observations about the moral and legal
orders. Professor Stumpf points out the obvious-that much of the
law is not morally neutral and that moral considerations are relevant
in legislating and in judicial decision-making-and a great portion of
the book is devoted to re-establishing this rather uncontroversial conclusion. How relevant these moral considerations are, particularly
in judicial decision-making, is never made quite clear, perhaps partly
because Stumpf is not a lawyer by profession. Another point which
the author makes and remakes is that morality invests human beings
with certain rights; but he never really specifies what these rights
are. The most he says in this regard is that "the law does not
invest a human being with the qualities of worth and dignity and
the other values which flow from these: these values are intrinsic to
human nature when viewed from the standpoint of morality. ..
17

DEVANE, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 160 (1965).
Director, The Law-Medidne Center, Western Reserve University. A.B. 1938,
Western Reserve University; LL.B. 1941, Harvard. Professor of Law, Western Reserve
University.
t Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University.
I STUMPF, MORALITY AND THE LA-,v 238 (19&j).
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but this does not tell us very much, particularly when followed by
phrases such as "specific rights come to light only as conditions focus
on them." On the whole, then, one finds Professor Stumpf's conclusions either unexceptionable or too vague and general to permit
much comment or, I would add, to be of much interest.
A disturbing feature about the book, however, is that the details
are so often wrong. A common feature of these errors is that they
usually arise from an attempted restatement of either a legal doctrine
or the substance of a particular philosopher's writings. Two examples-one from the area of international law, the other from legal
philosophy-will illustrate.
In discussing the International Court of Justice, Professor Stumpf
states that
representation on this court is limited to those nations which are
members of the United Nations and are duly elected by particular
nations, forming a list of nominees from which the Security Council and the General Assembly each separately choose fifteen judges;
any person on this list who is chosen by a majority of both bodies
is elected. 2.
There are several things clearly wrong with this statement: first, it
is individuals who sit on the court as judges, not nations represented
as political entities;8 second, it is not necessary that a person be a
citizen or national of a country that is a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice to be elected a judge on the International Court; third, a nation may be a party to the Statute of the
International Court without beinga member of the United Nations.
The Charter of the United Nations expressly provides that nonmembers may become parties to the Statute of the Court, 4 and the
Statute of the International Court expressly recognizes the right of
parties to the Statute who are not members of the United Nations to
participate in the election of the judges of the Court., Switzerland
2

Id. at 142.
8 "The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless
of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest
judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law."
STAT. INT'L Cr. JusT. art. 2.

' U.N.

CHART

art. 93, para. 2.

5The conditions under which States that are parties to the Court's Statute but not

members of the United Nations may participate in electing members of the Court shall

be laid down by the UN General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security

Council.

STAT. INT'L

CT. JusT. art. 4, para. 3. The procedure under which nonmembers
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is perhaps the most notable example of a nonmember of the United
Nations which is a party to the Statute of the Court and whose
nationals have served as judges on the Court.8
Turning to legal philosophy, Professor Stumpf makes the following assertion concerning John Austin:
Because Austin thought chiefly in terms of English monarchy
and aristocracy, he made the mistake of thinking that in all governments the sovereigns are not bound by the laws they make. In
America the rulers are bound by the laws they make, and even
more significant is the fact that the lawmakers are also bound by
the fundamental law of the Constitution.
Austin emphasized that there is no legal limitation to the
sovereign's power. This is simply a play on words, because it
means that there are no laws when the sovereign begins being a
sovereign. First there is a sovereign, then his commands become
the law, so it may be theoretically correct that there are no legal
limitations to the sovereign. But again, in constitutional government, the constitution is the basic law and it limits the powers
of the sovereign, so that in this case not even the verbal symmetry
in Austin's argument will hold.i
To my mind, this passage evidences a complete lack of comprehension
of Austin's position. He did in fact consider the American experience; and his whole point was not that the sovereign is free when
he "begins being a sovereign," but that by definition the sovereign
is legally free to do whatever he wants at any time, and this legal
freedom extends to changing the ground rules under which a particuof the United Nations who are parties to the Statute of the Court may participate
in the election of judges is set out in United Nations General Assembly Resolution
264(111), Oct. 8, 1948.
OLiechtenstein and San Marino are also parties to the Court's Statute although
they are not members of the United Nations. See [1964-1965] I.C.J.Y. 50. In addition,
Japan was a party to the Statute of the Court for more than two years before it became
a member of the United Nations. Ibid. The Statute of the Court (Article 35 (2)) also
authorizes the Court to be opened to states which are neither parties to the Statute
of the Court nor members of the United Nations, the latter being ipso facto parties
to the Statute of the Court. Two such nonmember states which have access to the
Court as a result of their having filed appropriate general declarations are the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Republic of Viet-Nam. Id. at 80-32.
Two Swiss nationals have served as Judges ad hoc on the International Court of
Justice. M. Paul Guggenheim was selected by Liechtenstein as its Judge ad hoc
in the Nottebohm Case, [1954-1955] I.C.J.Y. 18, and M. Paul Carry was selected by
Switzerland as a Judge ad hoc in the Interhandel Case, [1957-1958] I.C.J.Y. 18. In
addition, during the period when Japan was not a member of the United Nations, M.
Shigeru Kuriyama was nominated for election to the Court. [1955-1956] I.C.J.Y. 18.
Several Swiss nationals have been similarly nominated for election to the Court.
vSTutMPF, op. cit. supra note 1, at 106-07.
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lar political society is functioning. In a constitutional society, therefore, the sovereign is that entity which can amend the constitution.
In Austin's view the sovereign in the United States is a conglomerate
entity consisting roughly of the electors of the Congress and state
legislatures, since this conglomerate theoretically can force the initiation and ratification of amendments to the Constitution., Because
the sovereign so identified can change the Constitution for any reason
whatsoever, it is not in Austin's sense bound by the Constitution.
Accordingly, Stumpf's argument that the American form of government contradicts Austin's theory of sovereignty had already been
anticipated and met by Austin, for what Stumpf calls "rulers" or
"lawmakers" are not what Austin calls the sovereign. A more meaningful criticism of Austin's conception of sovereignty might be that,
in his insistence that the sovereign be legally all powerful, Austin
must of necessity, in a diversified political society such as the United
States, recognize a sovereign that is so unwieldly and so large (in
' "The supreme government of the United States of America agrees (I believe) with
the foregoing general description of a supreme federal government. I believe
that the common government, or the government consisting of the congress and
the president of the united states, is merely a subject minister of the united states'
governments. I believe that none of the latter is properly sovereign or supreme, even
in the state or political society of which it is the immediate chief. And, lastly, I
believe that the sovereignty of each of the states, and also of the larger state arising
from the federal union, resides in the states' governments as forming one aggregate
body: meaning of a state's government, not its ordinary legislature, but the body of
its citizens which appoints its ordinary legislature, and which, the union apart, is
properly sovereign therein. If the several immediate chiefs of the several united states,
were respectively single individuals, or were respectively narrow oligarchies, the sovereignty of each of the states, and also of the larger state arising from the federal
union, would reside in those several individuals, or would reside in those several
oligarchies, as forming a collective whole.*
" The Constitution of the United States, or the constitution of their general
government, was framed by deputies from the teveral states in 1787. It may (I think)
be inferred from the fifth article, that the sovereignty of each of the states, and also
of the larger state arising from the federal union, resides in the states' governments
as forming one aggregate body. It is provided by that article, that 'the congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary shall propose amendments to
this constitution: or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments: which amendments, in either
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by convention -in
three-fourths thereof.' See also the tenth section of the first article: in which section,
some of the disabilities of the several states' governments are determined expressly."
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 250-51 (The Library of Ideas ed.
1954). (Emphasis added. Austin's emphasis underscored.)
Professor Stumpf refers to this work a great deal in his book but has apparently
overlooked or disregarded this passage.
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the United States of the present day it might consist of as many as
100 million people) as to be unable as a practical matter to exercise
the unlimited power which by definition it has. And perhaps this is
something that might be said for the wisdom of such a form of government.
Stumpf's lack of understanding of Austin is exhibited also in his
treatment of Austin's references to "positive morality," a-term which
Austin uses to embrace a wide variety of concepts ranging from a
society's ethical values to commercial custom and even to what many
people would consider elements of the law itself. For Austin, consitutions were part of positive morality-not part of the positive law
in his narrow use of the word "Law"--because the sovereign could
always change the constitution. Since for Austin the notion of law
connoted the idea of being bound, what we call constitutional law
was therefore not law in the strict sense, but likewise a part of positive morality. From Austin's description of constitutional law as
positive morality Stumpf concludes that
Austin's analysis reveals ...

the conjunction of law and morals.

Referring to these moral laws in the structure of constitutional
lawmaking, he regrets that he has found them there because they
upset the logical rigor of his system, but with admirable candor he,
[Austin] writes,

"Though, in logical rigour, much of the so-called law which
relates to the Sovereign, ought to be banished from the Corpus
Juris, it ought to be inserted in the Corpus Juris for reasons of
convenience which are paramount to logical symmetry. For
though, in strictness, it belongs to positive morality or to ethics, a
knowledge of it is absolutely necessary in order to have a knowledge
of the positive law with which the Corpus Juris is properly concerned." 9

Stumpf's conclusion is totally inaccurate and it misses the point
of the very passage which he quotes to support his conclusion. When
Austin speaks (and not regretfully) of including portions of positive
morality in the study of law, he means constitutional law in some"thing like its traditional meaning. 10 He is not referring to what
9 STumP,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 110. (Italics in original omitted.)
LoThe relationship between positive morality and constitutional law is made clear
from two passages from Austin's Lectures, the first appearing a few paragralihs before
the passage quoted by Stumpf and the second immediately following the passage

quoted by Stumpf.

"Now, so far as public law relates to the Sovereign, it is clear that much of it is
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Stumpf, in the passage just quoted, calls "moral laws" or to those
natural rights whose protection Stumpf sees as the goal and justification of the law.
I started this review by stating that this is a disappointing book.
The similarity of the title to that of Professor Fuller's fairly recent
book, The Morality ofLaw (1965), cannot go unnoticed. Fuller,
starting from the interconnection of law and morality, has tried to
state in concrete terms how morality affects the law. Professor
Fuller's book has met much criticism, but he deserves the gratitude
of the profession for stating his conclusions in a way that invited
comment and controversy. In contrast, Professor Stumpf, never
having gotten beyond the truism that law and morality are interconnected-after all, the law deals with man and man is a moral and
political animal-has left us nothing but details to quibble over.
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE*
not law, but is merely positive morality, or ethical maxims. As against the monarch
properly so called, or as against the sovereign body in its collective and sovereign
capacity, the so-called laws which determine the constitution of the State, or which
determine the ends or modes to and in which the sovereign powers shall be exercised,
are not properly positive laws, but are laws set by general opinion, or merely ethical
maxims which the Sovereign spontaneously observes.
"In strictness,' therefore, much of the public law which relates to the Sovereign or
State, is not matter for any portion of the corpus juris: understanding by the corpus
juris, the system or collective whole of the positive laws which obtain in any society
political and independent.
"The case which I am now considering is one of the numerous cases wherein law
and morality are so intimately and indissolubly allied, that, though they are of distinct natures and ought to be carefully distinguished, it is necessary nevertheless to
consider them in conjunction. A description, therefore, of the law which regards the
constitution of the State, and which determines the ends or modes to and in which the
Sovereign exercises the sovereign powers, is an essential part of a complete corpus
juris, although, properly speaking, that so-called law is not positive law." 2 AuSnN,
LEcruRZs ON JuRisPRuDENCcE 745-46 (5th ed. 1855).
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1955, LL.B. 1957, Coloumbia University; Diploma in International Law 1962, Cambridge University; S.J.D. 1966, Harvard
University.

